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Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000200230034-2

[redacted]

copy 1 of 7
15 November 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO, Relations with

1. On this date [redacted] and the writer had a brier conference with Dr. Scoville. The following matters were discussed:

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a. I briefly summarized the several cables which had been received from [redacted] our Security Officer at General Greer's installation, wherein [redacted] expressed serious concern from the Security standpoint over the plans being drawn up by a Strategic Air Command planning group. One of the plans would involve duplicating the entire CORONA operation. It was pointed out to Dr. Scoville that even if the plans were not finally "bought", the longer we permit the SAC people to actively pursue the feasibility of SAC utilizing the CORONA assets, the greater is the danger of doing serious damage to CORONA security.

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I mentioned to Dr. Scoville that the cables received from [redacted] were sent with the cognizance of General Greer. In addition [redacted] of the NRO is aware of the climate. Dr. Scoville stated that he would discuss the matter with Dr. Charyk.

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b. Dr. Scoville's attention was invited to another expression of concern submitted by [redacted] wherein [redacted] indicated that it was planned to move the CORONA operation [redacted] et. al.) out from under SSD and place it directly under General Greer in his well-known satellite reconnaissance capacity. Dr. Scoville observed that he has difficulty understanding the real significance of such a proposed move since it was never quite clear to him exactly how General Greer blended in with the SSD structure and also handled his direct line responsibilities to Dr. Charyk. I restated the concern expressed by [redacted] to the fact that such a move would be definite confirmation to all the people in the broad SSD structure that CORONA was in fact a photo reconnaissance satellite a la SAMOS. Dr. Scoville borrowed the two cables on this subject and indicated that he would also discuss this matter with Dr. Charyk.

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c. I mentioned to Dr. Charyk that [redacted] Secur is concerned over the recent visits of Dr. Charyk and his staff to various suppliers without clearing beforehand through Security. I informed him that I had drafted a cable to the NRO restating the basic policy with regard to visits to

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NRO review(s)
completed.

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25X1A [] contractors and other project facilities which policy required that [] Security be informed beforehand in order that clearances could be certified to the facility, etc. Dr. Scoville wholeheartedly agreed with our endeavor to crack down in this area and even observed that if the NRO people do not comply in the future, we should inform the contractor to refuse admittance!

d. I also invited the DD/R's attention to the "must-know" paragraph which is included in the [] Security issuance which has been referred to Dr. Charyk for signature. The paragraph reads as follows:

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"Approval of "must-know" for all individuals associated with the NRP will be made by the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) and specifically designated senior Program officials. Employees and officials of U. S. Government departments, agencies and offices who are not directly involved in the NRP but for whom access to NRP project information is deemed essential, must be approved by the DNRO or his designee. This includes policy officials of the U. S. Government who require knowledge of the reconnaissance effort but not the specific details of the separate projects."

It was emphasized to Dr. Scoville that reading this paragraph literally you would see that Dr. Charyk's office would approve "must-know" for individuals, for example, in the State Department, Bureau of the Budget, White House, Congress, etc., who were scheduled to be briefed on I, C, A or O. Until either Colonel Ledford or Dr. Scoville were identified as Approving Officers as the "designee" of the DNRO, it would be necessary for us to obtain the approval of the NRO before, for example, we could brief an official of the FAA, or White House, etc. Dr. Scoville remarked that actually we had agreed to that concept during the days that the NRO atmosphere was much friendlier. He suggested that the present cool climate will undoubtedly improve and with the designation of a CIA representative as a "must-know" approving authority, we will be able to avoid the necessity of going to the NRO each time we desire to brief such an individual.

25X1A Under this concept when this [] paper is signed off by Dr. Charyk, I suggested that all requests for I, C, A & O clearances from U. S. Government agencies not directly involved in the NRP, which at the present time are being routed through the Security Branch, OSA, for OSA concurrence as to the "need-to-know", henceforth should be referred from the originating [] Control Officer in the particular U. S. Government department to the [] for approval of "must-know" and directly to the Special Security Center in the Office of Security/CIA for clearance

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processing. Dr. Scoville seemed to think that this manner of processing would be desirable since it would put the monkey on the back of the NRO to say "no" in some touchy cases, e.g., high State Department officials.

e. Another matter discussed was the recent incident wherein [redacted] Security was contacted by [redacted] of the NRO with the information that Dr. Charyk desired a quick "C" clearance for a representative of [redacted]. At that time no information was provided to this office with regard to the reason for this request for a "C" clearance. It was indicated that [redacted] enroute at that moment to Dr. Charyk's office. The clearance was granted. Subsequently, we had a call from the West Coast [redacted] with a request for three additional clearances [redacted]. It was determined that the NRO was endeavoring to expeditiously incorporate into the CORONA vehicle

[redacted] Dr. Scoville indicated that he became aware of the concept and Dr. Charyk's interest about the same time the Security Branch received the request for the clearance of [redacted]. I emphasized that in order to protect the security of CORONA, it would be essential that Security get in on the ground floor of such proposals in order that individuals brought in on such short notice could be properly briefed and given instructions as to how to protect CORONA information at their home plants, etc. I indicated that with Dr. Scoville's concurrence I would take action to discuss this matter with appropriate officials of the NRO. Dr. Scoville concurred.

Chief, Security Branch
OSA

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